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1The scope of Roommate’s motion for summary judgment is limited to plaintiffs’ federal FHA claim.
Roommate does not challenge plaintiffs’ standing under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act
(FEHA) or the Unruh Civil Rights Act.  Nor does Roommate challenge the applicability of these state laws
(continued...)
PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1
I.  INTRODUCTION.
Defendant Roommate.Com, LLC (“Roommate”)’s motion for summary judgment
(Dkt. 122) should be denied.  Plaintiffs have standing under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”)
because they diverted scarce resources from other priorities to investigate and counteract
Roommate’s discrimination.  Fair Housing of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 902-05 (9th
Cir. 2002) (hereinafter “FHM”).  Likewise, Roommate’s arguments that the FHA does not
apply to the rental of rooms, and that applying the FHA to room rental violates the right to
intimate association must be rejected.   The FHA applies to the rental of rooms.  United
States v. Space Hunters, 429 F.3d 416, 425-27 (2d Cir. 2005).  The application of the FHA
to the rental of rooms does not violate the right to intimate association.  See Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-20 (1984).
In making the argument that applying the FHA to the rental of rooms violates the
right to intimate association or offends certain HUD enforcement guidance, Roommate
misconstrues what is at issue in this case.   This case challenges the conduct of Roommate,
a housing information vendor.   It does not challenge the ultimate choices and decisions
made by individual users of  roommates.com in offering or picking rental opportunities.  At
issue here is Roommate’s conduct, not that of its users.   This case does not, for example,
seek to hold an individual user liable for seeking to live only with persons of the same sex.
Whether that decision is covered by the FHA turns on an intensive factual examination of
the unique circumstances in which that particular rental opportunity is offered.  42 U.S.C.
§ 3603(b).  Instead, this case asks, among other things, whether a housing information
vendor, such as Roommate, may require homeseekers to disclose their protected class status,
and then use that information to screen and steer those homeseekers. That conduct neither
implicates intimate associations nor was addressed in the HUD enforcement guidance on
which Roommate relies.1  
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1(...continued)
to the rental of rooms or argue that these laws are unconstitutional.  The Ninth Circuit reinstated plaintiffs’
state-law claims in April.  FHC v. Roommate.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 2
II.  ARGUMENT.
A. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT (CDA), 47 U.S.C. §230(c)(1).
In Part III.A of its opening brief, Roommate invokes the CDA for the proposition that
it cannot be liable for the additional comments section of its website, for unprompted
searches conducted by users, or for “misuse” of the site, presumably meaning use of its site
by individuals who are not renting shared housing.  Plaintiffs acknowledge that the Ninth
Circuit ruled that the “additional comments” section is covered by the CDA.  Roommate’s
motion does not, however, establish that it is entitled to CDA immunity with respect to any
of the remaining claims in this case.  
First, five of the six theories of liability asserted by plaintiffs in this action do not treat
Roommate as publisher or speaker of information provided by a third party.  (See plaintiffs’
inquiries, causing, steering, screening, and aiding claims, described in parts III.B, C, D, E,
and G respectively of plaintiffs’ summary judgment brief (Dkt. 118).)  Roommates.com has
no CDA immunity for any of these claims at all.  With respect to these five claims, any
question of “misuse” is therefore irrelevant.  Any liability under these theories does not
“aris[e] from content created by third parties,” so CDA immunity does not apply.
Roommate, 521 F.3d at 1162. 
Second, plaintiffs have asserted one theory of liability that does treat Roommate as
the publisher of content provided in part by third parties – i.e., for which liability does arise
from content created in part by third parties.  This is plaintiffs’ publishing claim.  (Dkt. 118,
part III.F.)  Roommate presumably is contending that it is not liable on this claim to the
extent that the content at issue is produced by users who are not offering shared housing for
rent.  To prevail on this argument, Roommate must, at minimum, show that it does not
“contribute materially to the alleged illegality” of the information.  FHC v. Roommate.Com,
LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).  Roommate has not attempted, let alone
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succeeded in making, any such showing, and cannot since it “contributes materially” to the
challenged content by requiring disclosure of user’s discriminatory preferences, and then
generating profiles that publish those preferences.  See Dkt. 118, at pp.  8-13.  Accordingly,
Roommate’s claim of CDA immunity must be denied with respect to plaintiffs’ sixth theory
of liability as well.
Roommate’s other contentions in Part III.A of its brief – that its users are not
“landlords” and that roommates.com does not concern “commercial” activity – are rebutted
elsewhere in this brief (see part D.3, below).
B. PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING UNDER THE FHA.
Roommate has attacked plaintiffs’ standing to bring this case under the FHA.  (Dkt.
122, pp. 5-8.)  Roommate’s attack is misplaced, because plaintiffs are aggrieved persons
within the meaning of the FHA and have standing to bring this action on the basis of their
concrete injuries.
Plaintiffs Fair Housing Council of the San Fernando Valley (“FHC/SFV”) and Fair
Housing Council of San Diego (“FHC/SD”) are both nonprofit corporations that provide fair
housing services in various parts of Southern California.  (Plaintiffs’ Statement of Genuine
Issues of Material Fact, filed concurrently herewith [hereinafter [“SS Response”], at ¶ 19(a),
(b).)  Their missions are to promote fair housing, ensure equal housing opportunities for all,
and eradicate all forms of illegal housing discrimination.  (SS Response ¶ 19(a), (b).)  They
engage in a variety of programs and activities to further their missions, including fair
housing counseling, community education and outreach, and investigative services such as
monitoring and testing.  (SS Response ¶ 19(a) ,(b).)  
The FHA allows “[a]n aggrieved person” to commence a civil action.  42 U.S.C.
§3613(a)(1)(A).  An “aggrieved person” includes any person who “claims to have been
injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or (2) believes that such person will be injured
by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur.”   Id. §3602(i).  A “person”
includes, among others, an individual, corporation, or association.  Id. §3602(d).  The
Supreme Court has consistently held that the definition of aggrieved person in the FHA
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reflects “a congressional intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article
III of the Constitution.”  Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).  The
sole requirement for plaintiffs to sue under the FHA is the Article III minima of injury in
fact: that the plaintiff alleges that as a result of defendant’s actions, it has suffered a distinct
 and palpable injury.  Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982).  It is well-
settled that fair housing organizations, like plaintiffs in this case, have standing to sue to the
extent that they suffer injuries proximately caused by a defendant’s unlawful conduct. 
FHM, 285 F.3d at 902-05; Smith v. Pacific Prop. and Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1104-06
(9th Cir. 2004).  Those types of injuries are generally referred to as diversion of resources
and frustration of mission.   FHM, 285 F.3d at 902-05; Smith, 358 F.3d at 1104-06.  The
evidence submitted by plaintiffs establishes the requisite injury, showing both a diversion
of the agencies’ scarce resources and frustration of their missions.
1. Plaintiffs Diverted Scarce Resources to Investigate and Counteract the 
Practices of Roommate’s Website, Roommates.com.
In FHM, the plaintiff fair housing organization established standing at the merits phase
of the litigation because the record demonstrated that the organization had diverted resources
from other priorities and activities to investigate and counteract the defendant’s
discrimination.  Id. at 905.  The organization established standing based on staff time
expended in connection with investigating the existence and extent of defendant’s
discriminatory practices and conducting education and outreach aimed at counteracting
defendant’s discriminatory housing practices.  Id.  The plaintiff fair housing organizations
here did the same and similar activities.
The evidence in this case establishes that plaintiffs  have devoted scarce resources to
investigate and counteract Roommate’s discrimination, at the expense of other programs and
activities.  Plaintiff FHC/SFV was injured when it: 
(1) Devoted significant resources in terms of staff time to investigating the existence
and extent of discrimination by roommates.com, diverting the organization’s scarce
resources from other activities and programs (SS Response ¶ 19(c)).
Case 2:03-cv-09386-PA-RZ   Document 133   Filed 09/29/08   Page 13 of 35   Page ID #:1953
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 5
(2) Devoted significant resources to counteract the harmful effects of discrimination
by roommates.com by engaging in activities in direct response to Roommate’s
discrimination, such as: (a) distributing education and outreach literature to 64 media and
advertising entities, including newspapers and radio stations, to provide information
regarding the unlawfulness of discriminatory advertising; (b) reallocating scarce resources
from normal activities to address discriminatory advertising; (c) revising training materials
to place a greater emphasis on discriminatory advertising, consequently placing less
emphasis on other important subjects; (d) creating a new education and outreach brochure
to emphasize discriminatory advertising; and, (e) distributing education and outreach
literature to more than 100 media and real estate professionals to provide information about
the unlawfulness of discriminatory advertising (SS Response ¶ 19(d)).
Similarly, plaintiff FHC/SD was injured when it diverted its resources away from
other activities to address the conduct of roommates.com.  As a direct result of
roommates.com’s unlawful conduct, FHC/SD: 
(1) Devoted significant resources in terms of staff time to identifying the existence and
extent of discrimination by roommates.com in its service area, diverting scarce resources
from the organization’s other programs and activities, including its normal education and
outreach activities (SS Response ¶ 19(e)); and,
(2) Devoted significant resources to counteract the harmful effects of
roommates.com’s discrimination, at the expense of other education and outreach activities,
by engaging in activities such as (a) focusing on issues related to discrimination on the
Internet at FHC/SD’s annual Law and Litigation Conference, to the exclusion of other
subjects; (b) increasing the number of education and outreach presentations to members of
the community and revising the scope of these presentations to devote greater time and
resources to the subject of discriminatory advertising and discrimination on the Internet, at
the expense of other activities and subjects; and (c) focusing on the application of fair
housing on the Internet, at the expense of other subjects, in connection with
education/outreach presentations to housing providers (SS Response ¶ 19(f)).
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2. Roommate Injured Plaintiffs When it Frustrated their Missions.
As explained above, FHC/SFV and FHC/SD have a mission of ensuring equal housing
opportunities to all and eradicating all forms of illegal housing discrimination in their service
areas.  (SS Response ¶ 19(a), (b).)  Roommate’s website, which, by design, operates to limit
housing opportunities on the basis of protected characteristics including sexual orientation
and familial status, frustrates that mission.  See Smith, 358 F.3d at 1105 (holding that any
violation of the disability access provisions of the fair housing laws frustrated the mission
of the organizational plaintiff, whose mission was to eradicate discrimination against persons
with disabilities).  Plaintiffs’ missions are frustrated as long as Roommate’s website operates
in a discriminatory manner.  See Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. LOB, Inc., 92 F. Supp.
2d 456, 465 (D. Md. 2000) (award based on injury that will continue as long as housing
violates disability access provisions of the FHA). The FHA authorizes an entry of injunctive
relief to plaintiffs to remedy that violation.  42 U.S.C. §3613(c)(1), and plaintiffs seek that
remedy.  (Dkt. 10.)  Plaintiffs’ showing of injury supports its standing to obtain injunctive
relief.  See Florida State Conf. of NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1165-66 (11th Cir.
2008) (organization made sufficient showing of injury to confer standing to seek injunctive
relief where challenged statute would have required diversion of its resources in the future).
Furthermore, to remedy the frustration of their missions, plaintiffs seek to recover
damages for time and money they will spend in the future to monitor defendant’s compliance
with any consent decree or court order, and to educate the community about the fair housing
laws as they apply to room rentals and internet advertising.  (SS Response ¶ 19(g), (h).)
These are precisely the types of damages that other courts have permitted plaintiffs to
recover as a component of damages, and that have served to confer standing, in other fair
housing cases.  See, e.g., Chicago v. Matchmaker Real Estate Sales Center, Inc., 982 F.2d
1086 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming award of damages for future monitoring); HRC v. Krug, 564
F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1148-49 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (awarding frustration of mission damages for
future monitoring and education); Milsap v. Cornerstone Res. Mgmt., Inc., 2008 WL
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1994840, at *4 (S.D. Fla. May 5, 2008) (past and projected future expenditures conferred
standing).
3.  Roommate Relies on Case Law that Is Inapplicable and Inapposite.
Roommate relies extensively on FHC v. Montgomery Newspapers, 141 F.3d 71 (3d
Cir. 1998).  In FHM, however, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the defendant’s attempt
to use the Montgomery Newspapers decision to deny the standing of a fair housing
organization which, like the plaintiffs here, had diverted resources from other activities to
investigate and counteract the defendant’s discrimination.  285 F.3d at 903. 
In Montgomery Newspapers, the Third Circuit held that the fair housing organization
lacked standing on the basis of efforts undertaken to counteract the effects of the
newspaper’s discrimination because the organization simply failed to show that it had
actually undertaken any such efforts, and offered only vague speculation that it would
undertake such efforts in the future.  141 F.3d at 77-78.  In this case, by contrast, plaintiffs
have offered specific evidence of concrete steps that they have already taken to counteract
the discriminatory effects of Roommate’s discrimination, and have explained in detail how
these efforts have caused their organizations to divert resources from other activities and
priorities (SS Response ¶ 19(d), (f)).  As in FHM, this case bears no relationship to
Montgomery Newspapers.
The Third Circuit also held that the fair housing organization lacked standing on the
basis of its investigation into defendant’s conduct because the organization failed to show
that it actually undertook any investigation as a result of the newspaper’s discrimination.
Id. at 78.  The claimed investigation – scanning newspapers for the presence of
discriminatory advertisements – was an activity in which the organization would have
engaged irrespective of the discrimination challenged in the lawsuit.  Id.  In this case, by
contrast, as a direct result of discrimination by roommates.com, plaintiffs were forced to
divert resources from other programs and activities to investigate roommates.com to
determine whether and to what extent roommates.com engaged in discriminatory practices
(SS Response ¶ 19(c), (e)).  This investigation would not have occurred but for
Case 2:03-cv-09386-PA-RZ   Document 133   Filed 09/29/08   Page 16 of 35   Page ID #:1956
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 8
roommates.com’s discrimination.  In this case, as in FHM, plaintiffs’ investigation confers
standing.
While the Third Circuit held that the fair housing organization could not establish
standing on the basis of litigation expenses alone, id. at 78-80, the Ninth Circuit made clear
in FHM, that a fair housing organization’s diversion of resources to investigate and
counteract alleged discrimination are not litigation expenses.  285 F.3d at 905.  As in FHM,
plaintiffs rely on its diversion of resources to investigate and counteract Roommate’s
discrimination, actions unrelated to litigation.  Plaintiffs therefore have standing.
Finally, Roommate’s attempt to undercut plaintiffs’ standing by arguing that plaintiffs
have not submitted evidence of any particular individuals who have been the victims of
Roommate’s discriminatory practices is misplaced.  First, as in FHM and Havens, plaintiffs
assert standing based on their own injuries, not injuries of others.  There is no legal
requirement for plaintiffs to identify other victims.  Second, plaintiffs have produced
evidence of particular individuals who have been the victims of Roommate’s discriminatory
practices.  (SS Response ¶ 20.)
C.  THE FHA APPLIES TO THE RENTAL OF ROOMS.
Roommate argues as a matter of statutory interpretation that the FHA does not apply
to the transactions proposed on roommates.com because they involve shared living quarters.
 (Dkt. 122, pp. 8-16.)  As a preliminary matter, Roommate has not shown by any evidence
that its website, in fact, is used only by persons who will share a residence.  (SS Response
¶ 1.)  In any event, Roommate’s argument cannot be sustained because the FHA
unquestionably applies to the rental of rooms.   See Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F. 3d 424-25.
1.  The FHA Applies to the Rental of Rooms.  
a.  Statutory Language.  The language of the FHA unambiguously indicates that
the FHA applies to the rental of rooms.  The Act prohibits discrimination in connection with
the rental of “dwellings,” 42 U.S.C. §3604(a)-(f), which the Act defines as any space
intended to be occupied as a residence: “‘Dwelling’ means any building, structure, or portion
thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one
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or more families.”  Id. §3602(b); see id. §3602(c) (“‘Family’ includes a single individual.”).
Rooms rented as a person’s residence are “dwellings” and are therefore subject to the Act.
Section 3603(b)(2) also demonstrates that the FHA applies to rooms.  This provision,
known as the Mrs. Murphy exemption, provides that certain prohibitions of the FHA do not
apply to “rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended to be
occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other, if the owner
actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his residence.”  42 U.S.C. §
3603(b)(2).  This explicitly limited exemption from the FHA carved out for the rental of
certain rooms compels the conclusion that the FHA applies generally to the rental of rooms.2
If, as Roommate contends, the FHA does not apply to rooms, the limited exemption for
rooms becomes meaningless and superfluous.  Boise Cascade Corp. v. EPA, 942 F.2d 1427,
1432 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Under accepted canons of statutory interpretation, we must interpret
statutes as a whole, giving effect to each word and making every effort not to interpret a
provision in a manner that renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent,
meaningless or superfluous.”).
b.  Legislative History.  Notwithstanding Roommate’s claim to the contrary
(Dkt. 122, pp. 10-11), the FHA’s legislative history abounds with statements demonstrating
Congress’s understanding that the FHA applies to the rental of rooms.  The FHA’s chief
sponsor, Walter Mondale, told the Senate that the Act prohibits selecting roomers on the
basis of protected status: “insofar as a homeowner honestly chooses a roomer on the basis
of personal friendship, or because he is a relative, for example, he would not violate the Act.
The act forbids refusals only on the basis of ‘race, color, religion or national origin.’”  114
Cong. Rec. 2273 (1968) (emphasis added).  (Congress later added sex, familial status, and
disability to the statuses protected by the FHA.)  In addition, in connection with
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congressional debate over the Mrs. Murphy exemption, Congress repeatedly manifested its
explicit understanding that the exemption provided only a limited exemption for the rental
of rooms.  Senator Mondale, for example, stated that the Mrs. Murphy exemption “exempts
the rental or lease of a room or rooms” from the Act, but only with respect to “owner-
occupied” housing.  114 Cong. Rec. 2495 (1968).  Senator Stennis stated that the Mrs.
Murphy exemption “applies only to owners” and “would not protect a person who was
himself renting or leasing his home and taking in boarders.”  114 Cong. Rec. 3345 (1968).
Representative Corman stated that the Mrs. Murphy exception covered only “rooms or units
in an owner-occupied dwelling.”  114 Cong. Rec. 9600 (1968).
Indeed, Congress consciously resisted efforts to broaden the Mrs. Murphy exemption
to cover the rental of rooms generally.  Although Senator Robert Byrd offered an amendment
to exempt the rental of rooms from the FHA, 114 Cong. Rec. 4965 (1968) (amendment No.
581) (exempting the sale or rental by a person of any “dwelling owned or rented by such
person”), the amendment was not adopted.  Although conservative senators such as Byrd and
Stennis sought to extend the Mrs. Murphy exemption to allow discrimination generally in
the rental of rooms, Congress consciously and explicitly rejected these efforts to weaken the
bill. 
c.  HUD Regulations.  The official HUD regulations interpreting the FHA agree
that the FHA applies to room rentals.  HUD is the agency charged with implementing the
FHA and with promulgating formal regulations interpreting the Act.  Accordingly, courts
owe substantial deference to HUD’s FHA regulations.  Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 287-
88 (2003). 
Consistent with the language and legislative history, HUD’s regulations
unambiguously provide that, with the exception of the Mrs. Murphy exemption, the FHA
applies to the rental of rooms.  The applicable HUD regulations are 24 C.F.R. §§100.20
(defining dwelling as any space to be occupied as a residence by one or more individuals)
and 100.10(c)(2) (providing a limited exemption for the rental of rooms).  HUD has stated:
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Section 100.10...contains the limited exemption from the applicability of the
provisions of the Fair Housing Act, other than the prohibitions against discriminatory
advertising, for the sale or rental of certain single family houses by an owner and for
rentals of rooms in dwellings in which the owner also occupies a room (Mrs. Murphy
housing).
53 Fed. Reg. 44995 (Nov. 7, 1988) (emphasis added), accord 54 Fed. Reg. 3237 (Jan. 23,
1989).  HUD has made clear that term “dwellings,” as defined in §3602(b) of the FHA and
§100.20 of the regulations, includes situations “in which sleeping accommodations are
provided but toileting or cooking facilities are shared by occupants of more than one room
or portion of the dwelling.”  54 Fed. Reg. 3244 (Jan. 23, 1989).
d.  Case Law and Administrative Decisions.  Case law and administrative
decisions also confirm that the FHA applies to the rental of rooms, except to the extent the
Mrs. Murphy exemption applies.  Federal judicial decisions and HUD administrative
decisions interpreting the FHA have uniformly held that the FHA applies to the rental of
rooms.  In addition, a number of state courts and administrative agencies have applied state
and local fair housing laws that are comparable to the FHA to the rental of rooms.  Indeed,
plaintiffs are aware of no decision – judicial or administrative, federal or state – holding the
FHA does not apply to the rental of rooms.
i.  Federal Case Law.  The Second Circuit’s recent decision in United
States v. Space Hunters, 429 F.3d 416 (2d Cir. 2005), is squarely analogous to the instant
case.  The defendant, a housing information vendor offering services in connection with the
rental of rooms, argued that it was not liable under the FHA because any alleged
discrimination “pertains to the rental of rooms in private homes.”  Id. at 423 n.4.  The Second
Circuit disagreed.  The court held that the defendant was subject to the FHA except to the
extent that it could establish that its challenged conduct concerned rooms falling within the
Mrs. Murphy exemption – a showing it had failed to make.  Id. at 425-27 & n.6; see also
Marya, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 104 (applying the FHA to rental of a room in a house consisting
of six roomers who had separate bedrooms but shared common areas).
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Roommate offers no case law to the contrary.  Seniors Civil Liberties Association v.
Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1036 (11th Cir. 1992), cited by Roommate (Dkt. 122, p. 14-15), does
not hold that the FHA does not apply to the rental of rooms.  The decision, in fact, offers
absolutely no analysis on the scope of the FHA at all.  The other decision cited by
Roommate, Wilson v. Glenwood Intermountain Properties, 876 F. Supp. 1231, 1243 (D.
Utah 1995), vacated by 98 F.3d 590 (10th Cir. 1996), says even less about the application
of the FHA to the rental of rooms.  The court in Wilson held that, to the extent that the
FHA’s prohibition on sex discrimination conflicts with Title IX’s authorization of that same
discrimination in connection with university housing, Title IX would trump the FHA.  The
court’s conclusion on this point is dubious, but this Court need not resolve that issue here.
The instant case does not involve university housing and does not present a conflict between
the FHA and Title IX.  Accordingly, Wilson is not pertinent to this case.  In addition, the
decision has been vacated and is therefore of no precedential value.
ii.  HUD ALJ Decisions.  HUD’s administrative decisions also confirm
that the FHA applies to the rental of rooms.   In HUD v. Fung, 2008 WL 366380 (HUD ALJ
Jan 31, 2008), for example, an owner rented out rooms to three roomers.  The roomers had
private bedrooms but shared common areas, including a kitchen and bathroom.  Id. at *3.
The owner refused to rent one of the rooms to an African-American woman, claiming that
it was lawful to discriminate in connection with shared housing.  Id. at *8.  The HUD ALJ
disagreed, holding that the landlord violated the FHA by refusing to rent to room to the
woman because of her race.  Id. at *10.  Fung is not alone.  A number of HUD decisions
have applied the FHA to the rental of rooms.  In HUD v. Roberts, 2001 WL 56376 (HUD
ALJ Jan. 19, 2001), for example, the ALJ found an FHA violation in connection with the
rental of a room.  In HUD v. Lake Country Publications, 1994 WL 271082 (HUD ALJ Jan.
26, 1994), HUD entered a charge of discrimination in connection with a “classified
advertisement for the rental of a ‘room with kitchen privileges.’”  In HUD v. Williams,
442796, at *2 (HUD ALJ Mar. 22, 1991), the ALJ found an FHA violation in connection
with the rental of a room with a shared bath.  Like HUD’s regulations, these HUD ALJ
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decisions are entitled to deference from the courts.  Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1052
(9th Cir. 1999) (holding that courts owe deference to interpretations of the Act made in
HUD’s adjudicative proceedings).  Plaintiffs are unaware of, and Roommate fails to cite to,
any HUD decision holding that the FHA does not apply to the rental of rooms.
iii.  State Judicial and Administrative Decisions.  State judicial and
administrative adjudications draw the same conclusion.  See DFEH v. Desantis, FEHC Dec.
No. 02-12, 2002 WL 1313078 at 4-6 (Cal. FEHC 2002) (California Fair Employment and
Housing Commission held that FEHA applies to the rentals of rooms, except to the extent
that FEHA’s version of the Mrs. Murphy exemption applies); Voris v. Washington State
Human Rights Commission, 704 P.2d 632, 634 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (owner violated the
state fair housing law by discriminating on the basis of race “in the renting of a room in her
private home); State ex rel Sprague v. City of Madison, 205 Wis.2d 110, 555 N.W.2d 409
(table), 1996 WL 544099, *2-3 (Wis. App. Sept. 26, 1996) (individuals violated the Madison
fair housing ordinance by refusing to rent a room in their house to a woman because of her
sexual orientation).3
e.  HUD Guidance.  In 1989, HUD issued a regulation stating that it would not
pursue an administrative enforcement action with respect to an advertisement expressing a
preference based on sex where the housing involved shared living quarters and the
preference was designed to maintain single-sex living quarters.  See 54 Fed. Reg. 3309 (Jan.
23, 1989), proposing what became 24 C.F.R. §109.20(b)(5).  HUD removed this regulation
from the Code of Federal Regulations in 1996.  In the same vein, Assistant Secretary for Fair
Housing and Equal Opportunity Roberta Achtenberg issued a memorandum, cited by
Roommate, providing internal guidance to HUD regarding processing administrative
complaints.     
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Roommate mischaracterizes the 1989 guidance and the Achtenberg memorandum.
First, the 1989 guidance and Achtenberg memo do not interpret the FHA.  Nor do they apply
in any respect to private civil actions brought to enforce the FHA, such as the instant case.
The 1989 guidance and Achtenberg memorandum are  nothing more than a statement of
administrative guidance, explaining what types of administrative complaints HUD, in the
exercise of its discretion, will and will not pursue in connection with its internal complaint
process.  See 54 Fed. Reg. 3309 (setting forth the 1989 guidance) (“This part describes the
matters the Department will review in evaluating compliance with the Fair Housing Act in
connection with investigations of complaints alleging discriminatory housing practices
involving advertising.”); Achtenberg Memorandum (“The purpose of this memorandum is
to provide guidance on the procedures for the acceptance and investigation of allegations of
discrimination under Section 804(c) of the Fair Housing Act involving the publication of real
estate advertisements.”)  See Voris, 704 P.2d at 636 (commission’s ruling that it would not
enforce the state fair housing law against persons who discriminated on the basis of sex in
connection with the rental of shared living quarters “only amounts to a voluntary, self-
imposed limitation of the Commission’s power to enforce [the law]”).  Of course, even if
such guidance were an interpretation of the FHA, it would not be entitled to deference
because it was either removed from the Code of Federal Regulations or, in the case of the
Achtenberg Memorandum, was never published in the Code. 
Second, the 1989 guidance and Achtenberg  memorandum did not consider, let alone
address, the conduct at issue in this case: A housing information vendor that requires
disclosure of protected class status as a condition of service, and then uses that information
to steer and screen its users.   There is simply no reasonable way to contort the 1989
guidance and Achtenberg memorandum as providing cover for Roommate’s own conduct.
Third, the 1989 guidance refers to only one protected classification – sex.  This
guidance does not, as Roommate claims (Dkt. 122, p. 12), indicate that “HUD has construed
the FHA as not reaching shared living arrangements.”  On the contrary, the 1989 guidance
strongly supports plaintiffs’ contention that the FHA applies to the rental of rooms.  By
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singling out sex and not providing for any similar limits on enforcement for race, religion,
national origin, disability, and familial status, the 1989 guidance indicates that HUD will
enforce the advertising regulations as applied to shared housing on the basis of every
protected classification other than sex.   See Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 667 n.1 (9th
Cir. 1997) (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of others).  Nothing in the 1989
guidance suggests that HUD would not enforce the advertising guidelines in connection with
discrimination on the basis of race, familial status, or any other basis.  As for the Achtenberg
memo, its thrust is whether certain neutral terms should be construed to be discriminatory
– not that roommate decisions are exempt from the FHA.
f.  Other Arguments by Roommate.  Roommate’s brief discusses the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Dkt. 122, p. 10).  It is unclear how the 1964 Act is relevant here.  The
1964 Act, like the FHA, provides a limited exemption for the rental of rooms – applicable
to owner-occupiers who do not rent more than a few rooms, and says nothing about housing
information vendors that require users to disclose their protected class status and then use
that information to screen and steer.  42 U.S.C. §§2000a(b)(1).
Roommate’s brief also discusses Title IX, which prohibits sex discrimination by
educational institutions (Dkt. 122, p. 11).  Roommate wants this Court to make an inference
from the fact that Congress, when it enacted Title IX in 1972, failed to include language
exempting university housing from the FHA’s sex discrimination provisions.  In fact, the
FHA did not prohibit sex discrimination until 1974.  Robert G. Schwemm, Housing
Discrimination Law and Litigation §11C:1 (2008).  Roommate’s argument is therefore
factually incorrect and legally nonsensical.  
Roommate’s argument about 45 C.F.R. §86.32 (Dkt. 122, p. 11) is similarly flawed.
Roommate describes §86.32 as a “HUD” regulation and then asks how HUD could have had
the administrative authority to enact this regulation if it conflicts with the FHA.  Inasmuch
as §86.32 is a HHS regulation rather than a HUD regulation, Roommate’s argument is
factually and legally untenable.
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2.  The FHA Applies to Roommates.com Because the Site Concerns the 
Rental of Rooms and Roommate Has Made No Showing that the Mrs. 
Murphy Exemption Applies.
The FHA applies to Roommate because it is an housing information vendor creating
and distributing information about the rental of dwellings.  Under the FHA, to rent “includes
to lease, to sublease, to let and otherwise to grant for a consideration the right to occupy
premises not owned by the occupant.”  42 U.S.C. §3602(e).  It is undisputed that the
transactions proposed on roommates.com involve the granting of the right to occupy
residential premises not owned by homeseekers in exchange for the payment of a monthly
rent.  (Plaintiffs’ Separate Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law [Dkt.
119] [hereinafter “Fact”], Fact 4, 7, 11, 13, 20, 21, 49, 50, 54, 141-173, 180, 190.)  Indeed,
Roommate has repeatedly admitted that its business concerns providing information about
the rental of rooms.  (Fact 4, 7, 141, 143, 144.)
Roommate, moreover, has made no showing that it is exempt under the Mrs. Murphy
exemption.  The Mrs. Murphy exemption is an affirmative defense.  Space Hunters, 429 F.3d
at 425-26; Singleton v. Gendason, 545 F.2d 1224, 1226 (9th Cir. 1976).  Whether the
exemption applies “is a ‘highly fact-dependent inquir[y],’” turning on the size of the
dwelling and whether it is owner-occupied.  Space Hunters, 429 F.3d at 426 n.6 (quoting
Hogar Agua y Vida en el Desierto, Inc. v. Suarez-Medina, 36 F.3d 177, 182 n.4 (1st Cir.
1994)).  It is to be construed narrowly.  United States v. City of Hayward, 36 F.3d 832, 837
(9th Cir. 1994).  For example, in Space Hunters, the appellate court rejected the district
court’s reliance on the affidavit of the defendant, a housing information vendor, that “all the
rooms Space Hunters advertises fall within the ‘Mrs. Murphy’ exemption.”  429 F.3d at 426
n.6.  Here, Roommate has raised no argument (or adduced any evidence) that any – let alone
all – of the transactions proposed on roommates.com fall within this exemption.  (Fact 181-
182.)4 
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laws, federal, state, and local.  Within California, to lawfully discriminate in connection with the rental of
rooms, one must establish, at minimum, each of the following: (1) the proposed rental involves a “single-
family house”; (2) the housing provider rents out no more than one room; (3) the housing provider does
not make any discriminatory statements or publish any discriminatory advertisements, (4) the housing
provider owns and occupies the housing being rented; and (5) the housing provider does not discriminate
on the basis of race, religion, or national origin.  Cal. Gov’t Code §12927(c)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. §§1982,
3603(b)(2).  These exemptions are affirmative defenses, Space Hunters, 429 F.3d at 425-26, which
Roommate has the burden of raising and proving.  Roommate has raised no argument that these exemptions
apply to any of its users.
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D.  APPLICATION OF THE FHA TO THE RENTAL OF ROOMS DOES NOT 
VIOLATE THE RIGHT OF INTIMATE ASSOCIATION.
Roommate’s argument that applying the FHA to the rental of rooms violates the right
of intimate association (Dkt. 122, pp. 17-23) is flawed for three reasons.  First,  the conduct
challenged here – the discriminatory conducted of a housing information provider – does not
implicate intimate association. Second, Roommate lacks standing to assert the associational
rights of its users.  Third, the freedom of intimate association does not include a right to
discriminate in the rental of rooms.  The commercial relationship between a landlord or
proprietor who rents a room to a tenant or lodger is not an intimate one. 
1.  The First Amendment Does Not Apply to Roommate’s Own Conduct.  
The right of association does not protect Roommate’s own conduct.  The right of
association, no matter how broadly construed, does not create a right for a housing
information provider to demand disclosure of its users’ protected status or to limit users’
access to housing opportunities on the basis of those disclosures.   There is nothing in the act
of demanding users to publicly disclose their protected status, or in the act of steering or
screening users based on their status, that implicates intimate association.   Prohibiting
Roommate from committing these discriminatory housing practices does not impair
individuals’ housing choices in any way.  The ability of individuals to form intimate
associations does not depend on Roommate’s right to discriminate.  Even if certain
individuals in limited circumstances may be exempt from certain prohibitions under the
FHA, that possibility does not immunize Roommate for its own discriminatory conduct.
Indeed, it is Roommate that limits a person’s ability to associate by requiring her to answer
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discriminatory questions in order to participate in the housing market, and by limiting access
to housing choices.   Roommate, 521 F. 3d at 1166 (“This is no different from a real estate
broker in real life saying, ‘Tell me whether you’re Jewish or you can find yourself another
broker.’”)    
2.  Roommate Lacks Standing to Assert Constitutional Rights of the 
Customers who Are the Victims of its Discriminatory Practices.  
Roommate lacks standing to assert the associational rights of its users.  See Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (no third-party standing); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,
493 U.S. 215, 237 (1990) (questioning whether motel owners had standing to assert the
intimate association rights of the motel’s patrons).
Roommate’s attempt to cure this defect by claiming “representational standing” (Dkt.
122, p. 20) cannot succeed. The Ninth Circuit held in Fleck and Associates, Inc. v. Phoenix,
471 F.3d 1100, 1106 (9th Cir. 2006), that representational standing is limited to
organizations created to express the collective views and protect the collective interests of
their members.  Businesses which call their customers “members” do not enjoy
representational standing because their customers join the businesses’ membership rolls to
obtain access to the businesses’ goods and services rather than to express a collective
viewpoint or protect a collective interest.  In Fleck, for example, a sex club lacked
representational standing to challenge a city ordinance prohibiting such clubs on behalf of
the club’s “members” (customers who paid a membership fee) because the club’s “members”
were “merely customers.”  Id.  There was no evidence “that its customers in any way have
come together to form an organization for their mutual aid and benefit.”  Id.  The same is true
here.  Roommate’s “members” are mere customers of roommates.com.  They join
roommates.com for the limited, short-lived purpose of employing the website’s services to
locate housing or roomers, not to express views or protect a collective interest.  Accordingly,
Fleck precludes Roommate’s standing.
Conferring third-party standing on Roommate, moreover, would violate every
principle of the standing doctrine.  Roommate is in no position to represent the interests of
Case 2:03-cv-09386-PA-RZ   Document 133   Filed 09/29/08   Page 27 of 35   Page ID #:1967
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 19
its customers because Roommate’s interests in this litigation are adverse to that of its
customers.  Roommate’s customers are the victims of the practices that Roommate is here
defending.  As shown by the evidence submitted in Plaintiffs’ Statement of Genuine Issues
of Material Fact, Roommate’s customers – or at least a substantial number of them – would
rather not have to disclose their sexual orientation and other personal information as a
condition to obtaining access to Roommate’s database of available housing.  They would
prefer not to be prompted to express discriminatory preferences.  And they would rather not
be steered and screened on the basis of their sexual orientation or other protected status.  (SS
Response ¶ 20.)
3.  The Right of Intimate Association Does Not Include the Right to 
Discriminate in the Rental of Rooms.  
Even if Roommate could establish standing to assert the constitutional rights of others,
its argument fails on the merits.  The freedom of intimate association protects only
relationships “‘that attend the creation and sustenance of a family’ and similar ‘highly
personal relationships.’” IDK, Inc. v. Clark County, 836 F.2d 1185, 1193 (9th Cir. 1988)
(quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984)).  A number of considerations
inform the conclusion that the freedom of intimate association cannot be stretched to cover
the rental of rooms, as argued by Roommate. 
First, the freedom of intimate association encompasses only those fundamental
substantive due process rights already protected by the right to privacy.  Fleisher v. City of
Signal Hill, 829 F.2d 1491, 1500 (9th Cir. 1987).  Second, every time the Supreme Court has
considered an “intimate association” argument, it has rejected it.  Overton v. Bazzetta, 539
U.S. 126, 131 (2003); FW/PBS, Inc., 493 U.S. at 237; City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S.
19, 25 (1989); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621-22; Bd. of Directors of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club
of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987).  Third, the list of fundamental rights protected by the
substantive due process right to privacy (and, by extension, protected by the freedom of
intimate association) is short, including only “marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education.”  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003)
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(finding in the Constitution’s protection of liberty a non-fundamental right to engage in
enduring sexual relationships).  Fourth, heeding the Supreme Court’s counsel, the Ninth
Circuit has adopted an exceedingly narrow interpretation of the freedom of intimate
association.  See, e.g., National Ass’n for Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of
Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2000) (hereinafter “NAAP”) (holding that the
relationship between psychoanalyst and client was not protected by the right of intimate
association and stating that “these relationships simply do not rise to the level of a
fundamental right”); IDK, Inc., 836 F.2d at 1193 (holding that the sexual relationship
between escort and client is not an intimate association).
The Supreme Court has never extended the right of intimate association beyond highly
personal relationships involving the family.  Even if the right extends beyond family
relationships, moreover, it clearly does not extend to the opposite end of the spectrum –
commercial relationships.  The Court made this clear in Roberts, where it stated that the right
of intimate association imposed absolutely no constraints on the state’s rights to regulate the
“choice of fellow employees.” 468 U.S. at 620.  Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly
stated that a relationship – such as those at issue in this case – that lasts only so long as one
person is willing to pay the other cannot be an intimate one.  IDK, Inc., 836 F.2d at 1193;
NAAP, 228 F.3d at 1050; see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“[T]he State is free to impose any rational regulation on the commercial transaction itself.
The Constitution does not guarantee a right to choose employees, customers, suppliers, or
those with whom one engages in simple commercial transactions, without restraint from the
State.”).  In addition, the Supreme Court has explicitly held that, whereas regulation of the
family implicates fundamental rights, laws limiting the freedom of “unrelated individuals”
to live with persons of their choosing – such as those at issue in this case – are subject to
mere rational basis review.  Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498 (1977);
accord Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974) (same).
The Ninth Circuit has recognized five factors to be considered in determining whether
a particular association can claim the protection of the right of intimate association: “the
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group’s size, its congeniality, its duration, the purposes for which it was formed, and the
selectivity in choosing participants.”  IDK, Inc., 836 F.2d at 1193.  None of these factors
weighs in favor of creating a right to discriminate in the rental of rooms.
a.  The Group’s Size. A small group is not necessarily intimate.  See IDK, Inc.,
836 F.2d at 1193 (an escort and client were not intimates even though they were just two
persons – “the smallest possible association”); NAAP, 228 F.3d at 1050 (relationship with
one’s psychoanalyst not intimate even though it involves only two persons).  This factor does
not support Roommate’s argument.
b.  The Congeniality of the Group.  The transactions proposed on
roommates.com involve relationships that are (1) commercial, (2) subject to pervasive
government regulation, and (3) lacking in indicia of intimacy.
i.  Commerciality.  Roommate admits that the transactions proposed on
roommates.com involve “rooms for rent.”  (Fact 4, 49, 50, 141-146.)  It is undisputed that
the essence of these transactions is the exchange of “rent” for the right to occupy residential
premises, a commercial activity.  Fact 163 (housing providers specify “Monthly rent” – the
“Dollar amount you will charge monthly for rental”); Fact 169 (housing providers specify
“Monthly fee” – the “Dollar amount you will charge monthly for space”).  Homeseekers pay
“rent” (Fact 150, 152, 155-157, 163, 169, 180) and a “deposit” (Fact 164, 170) and assume
legally binding long-term financial obligations to continue to pay rent under a lease or an
otherwise binding rental agreement (Fact 151, 153, 158-161, 165, 171-173). 
ii.  Pervasive Government Regulation.  The transactions proposed on
roommate.com are also the subject of pervasive government regulation.  See Cal. Civ. Code
§1940 (providing that the regulations in Civ. Code §§1940-1954 apply to both tenancies and
lodgings).5  These statutes regulate every aspect of the provider-homeseeker relationship,
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lodging/tenancy distinction is of no importance here.  Whether they are characterized as lodgings or
tenancies, room rentals are subject to the same comprehensive set of regulations.  See Cal. Civ. Code §1940
(providing that the regulations in Civ. Code §§1940-1954 apply to both tenancies and lodgings); California
Practice Guide: Landlord-Tenant 2:42 (2008) (same).
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such as maintenance of the premises, habitability, rent, rights of entry, termination, notices,
security deposits, and application fees.  Cal. Civ. Code §§1940-1954.  For a summary of Civ.
Code §§1940-1954, see Declaration of Christopher Brancart, filed herewith, exhibit 18.
iii.  Lacking in Indicia of Intimacy.  The transactions proposed on
roommates.com, moreover, do not involve the most intimate setting – the bedroom.  Only
1.8% of the housing offered on roommates.com involves sharing a bedroom (Fact 174).
Indeed, half of the housing listed on roommates.com does not even involve the sharing of
a bathroom (Fact 175).  
The listings on roommates.com themselves demonstrate that users of roommates.com
are not looking for “deep attachments and commitments” or a high level of congeniality:
“I’m Independent, have my own life and am generally low maintenance.”  (Fact 184.)  “I am
looking for a responsible person who minds there [sic] own business.”  (Fact 183.)  “I’d like
someone who likes to keep to him/herself, doesn’t cook much and has a busy schedule.
Would like for the person to feel we can be housemates and help each other out if needed but
no need to socialize together or try to be friends.”  (Fact 185.)  “I’m looking for someone
who won’t come to me for rent money and will respect people’s space and belongings.  Not
a lot needed, just some responsibility and consideration.”  (Fact 186.)  Indeed, many of the
housing providers offering housing on roommates.com are not even looking for a
homeseeker with whom they will reside.  (Fact 176-179.)
The relationship attendant to the rental of rooms is simply less intimate than those
already found not to be protected by the freedom of intimate association.  E.g., IDK, Inc.,
836 F.2d at 1193 (sexual intimacy between escort and client); NAAP, 228 F.3d at 1050
(sharing secrets and emotional thoughts with psychoanalyst).
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c.  Duration of the Relationship.  Room rentals may last a few weeks or months
or even a year or more.  For the most part, however, they are not long-term.  A relationship
that lasts only so long as one person is willing to pay the other is not an intimate one.  IDK,
Inc., 836 F.2d at 1193; NAAP, 228 F.3d at 1050.  The relationships at issue in this case
involve only the rental of rooms; the relationship necessarily is a commercial one, and it lasts
only as long as a roomer continues to pay rent.
d.  The purpose for which the relationship was formed.  As explained, the rental
of rooms is a commercial relationship.
e.  The selectivity in choosing participants. Roberts describes a continuum
between those relationships clearly protected by the right of intimate association (choosing
someone to marry) and those clearly not protected by any such right (choosing coworkers).
468 U.S. at 620.  Indisputably, in terms of selectivity, selecting a roomer is comparable to
choosing a coworker rather than a spouse.  One is no more choosy in renting out rooms than
one is in selecting a sexual partner (IDK, Inc.), or a psychoanalyst (NAAP).
In sum, the rental of rooms on a commercial basis does not, by itself, create the kind
of intimacy protected by the Constitution.  What the Ninth Circuit said in IDK is equally
applicable here.  The relationship at issue here: 
possess[es] few, if any, of the aspects of an intimate association.  It lasts for a short
period and only as long as the [roomer] is willing to pay the fee.  [The participants do]
not claim to be involved in procreation, raising and educating children, cohabitation
with relatives, or the other activities of family life. While the relationship between
them involved some level of intimacy, it lacked “deep attachments or commitments.”
In sum, these were “not the ties that have played a critical role in the culture and
traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs.
IDK, Inc., 836 F.2d at 1193 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-19).
It is therefore not surprising that every court to have considered the matter has
concluded that the application of fair housing laws to the rental of rooms is constitutional.
Voris, 704 P.2d at 636 (rejecting defendant’s argument “that her right to choose the people
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with whom she will share her home outweighs the state’s interest in preventing
discrimination” because “[w]here one opens one’s home to the public by engaging in the
rental of rooms therein for monetary gain, one must be deemed to have voluntarily
subordinated personal privacy rights” to the state’s compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination); Sprague, 555 N.W.2d 409, 1996 WL 544099, at *3 (rejecting defendants’
argument that applying the fair housing ordinance to the rental of rooms violates the right
to privacy, association, or expression because they “gave up their unqualified right to such
constitutional protection when they rented housing for profit”).  No decision is contrary.
Roommate’s brief, rather than addressing the pertinent Ninth Circuit authorities
addressing associations between two people, focuses on a series of cases involving private
clubs.  The private club cases, however, involve altogether different fact patterns than the
cases discussed above and have no bearing on the analysis here because they involve social
rather than commercial relationships.
Finally, even if Roommate could establish that the right of intimate association applied
to the relationship between landlords/proprietors and tenants/lodgers in connection with the
rental of rooms, Roommate’s claim would fail because this litigation has no “direct and
substantial” influence on the exercise of that right.  Flaskamp v. Dearborn Pub. Sch., 385
F.3d 935, 942 (6th Cir. 2004) (regulations that do not directly and substantially affect rights
of association warrant only rational basis review). This action does not challenge any
individual’s rental decision.  It challenges only the right of a large housing information
vendor controlling 40,000 housing listings to require individuals to participate in a
discriminatory system in order to look for or post housing.  Any connection between the
challenged conduct – compelling homeseekers to disclose their protected status and
providing users with different housing opportunities based on their status – and the ability
of users to ultimately pick who they live with is tenuous at best. 
//
//
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E.  APPLYING THE FHA TO THE RENTAL OF ROOMS DOES NOT 
INFRINGE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS.
Roommate’s argument that the FHA infringes their users’ rights to receive and convey
information (Dkt. 122, pp. 24-25) is without merit.  Individuals do not have a constitutional
right to “obtain...information” (Dkt. 122, p. 24) from other persons when it entails
compelling others persons’ speech.  It is unlawful to demand that homeseekers disclose their
age, sex, sexual orientation, occupation, and familial status as a condition to participating in
the housing market (Dkt. 118, Part III.B), and nothing in the First Amendment makes these
demands less unlawful.  Nor is there an unrestricted constitutional right to “share
information” (Dkt. 122, p. 24).  The constitutionality of the FHA’s advertising provisions
– which prohibit “sharing” one’s discriminatory preferences in connection with the rental of
housing – has been clearly established for over 30 years.  Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d
995, 1002-05 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Cent. Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
563-64, 566 (1980), and Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973)); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 211-13 (4th Cir. 1972).
III.  CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons, Roommate’s motion for summary judgment should be
denied.     
Respectfully submitted, 
DATED: September 29, 2008. /s/ Christopher Brancart
BRANCART & BRANCART
Christopher Brancart
Elizabeth Brancart
Liza Cristol-Deman
Michael Evans
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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BRANCART IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; EXHIBITS 1
THROUGH 18; (3) PLAINTIFFS’ STATEMENT OF GENUINE ISSUES
OF MATERIAL FACT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; (4)
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ EVIDENTIARY
OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT’S SEPARATE STATEMENT OF
UNCONTROVERTED FACTS
upon the following person(s):
Mr. Timothy L. Alger
Quinn, Emanuel, Urquhart, Oliver & Hedges
865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90017
X
BY ELECTRONIC MAIL: By transmitting the above document(s) to the email
address of the person designated above, or by electronically filing the documents on
the Court’s ECF system. 
BY MAIL:  By placing a copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope, with postage
thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at Loma Mar, California, addressed as
set forth above.  
BY HAND DELIVERY:  By causing such document(s) to be delivered by hand to
the above person(s) at the address(es) set forth above.  
BY THIRD-PARTY COMMERCIAL CARRIER (OVERNIGHT DELIVERY): 
By delivering a copy thereof to a third-party commercial carrier, addressed as set
forth above, for delivery on the next business day.  
BY FACSIMILE:  By transmitting the above document(s) to the facsimile
number(s) of the addressee(s) designated above. 
I certify that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at
whose direction the service was made. 
 
Executed on September 29, 2008,  Loma Mar, California.  
/s/ Christopher Brancart
Christopher Brancart
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